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China’s securities markets are unlike those of Amsterdam, London or 
New York.  Those markets evolved over centuries from myriad interac-
tions among those seeking finance on the one hand and savers seeking 
rewarding investments on the other.  Such spontaneous securities mar-
kets did emerge throughout China in the 1980s following the start of 
economic liberalization, but these spontaneous markets were closed by 
the government in favor of new and tightly controlled exchanges estab-
lished in the early 1990s in Shanghai and Shenzhen.  These new markets, 
have been designed to and largely limited to, serving state purposes, that 
is to assist in the financing of the state sector of the economy.  Rather 
than evolving in a bottom-up pattern, they are controlled, top-down se-
curities markets.  This essay reviews as of June 2010, the development of 
these markets, the economic functions they perform, the regulatory 
structure that controls and shapes them, and the governance mechan-
isms – legal and otherwise – that controls the management of the PRC 
listed companies.  These markets represent a signal accomplishment of 
the Chinese leadership in producing in less than twenty years’ modern, 
albeit not yet fully developed, securities markets.  Whether they can be 
further developed to serve more basic economic role than they have been 
permitted to play is a question with which the essay concludes. 
      
                                                 
 
 The authors wish to thank the editors of this volume, Justice Jack B. Jacobs of the Delaware Su-
preme Court, and Ms. Huang, Jie, a member of the Beijing Bar, for their very helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this essay and Ms. Gao, Yi, NYU LL. M. 2009 and Ms. Wei Quiju NYU LL. M. 2010 for their re-
search assistance.  The authors of course are responsible for the errors or omissions that remain.  2 
 
 
  It is widely observed that, despite its remarkable economic progress over the last 
thirty years, the economy of China continues to require substantial development of its legal 
and financial infrastructure.  In that connection, this essay seeks to assess an important part 
of that infrastructure: the securities markets of China.  We assess those markets, both in 
terms of their size and composition and in terms of their economic function and impor-
tance to the Chinese economy.  In doing so, we also review and assess the regulatory re-
gime within which these markets function and the corporate governance mechanisms that 
operate upon the firms that are listed on the Chinese stock exchanges.  For reasons of 
space, we do not review the history of the evolution of these markets (see Greene 2003; 
Tan 2006), the corporatization program that created the firms that, for the most part, make 
up the listed firms on the two mainland exchanges (Aharony and Wong 2000) or, except 
briefly, the original share segmentation system that restricted ownership of shares. 
 
  The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges represent an effort initiated in the ear-
ly 1990s to centralize and develop securities trading in modern China.  Since that time those 
exchanges have grown rapidly in terms of listings, trading, products and regulatory struc-
tures.  They remain, however, a work in progress.  While quite large by some measures, 
these markets do not yet play a very important role in the finance of the Chinese economy.  
The finance of the Chinese economy continues to be dominated, on large scale projects, 
primarily by bank finance and direct and indirect government support and, on entrepre-
neurial finance level, primarily by foreign direct investment and a range of less formal ar-
rangements including friends and family, trade credit, business alliances and, importantly, 
local government support (Allen, Qian & Qian, 2005; Allen, Qian, Zhang and Zhao, 2010). 
The securities markets serve as a secondary source of finance to the Chinese economy.  
Access to securities markets in China has been tightly controlled by the state and these mar-
kets have largely played the role of a supplemental source of finance for large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).  The resulting markets are comparatively small in terms of the size of 
the general economy.  Prices of securities traded on them are volatile and do not appear to 
price securities very well.  Because prices on these markets do not appear to be efficiently 
set and because, as we show, the governance standards of the legal system they incorporate 
are ineffective, the market’s prices do not provide either a positive signaling function or a 
disciplinary function for the corporate management of listed firms.  Finally, because they 
have not yet evolved developed futures markets or a large capacity to create derivative se-
curities, the Chinese securities markets do not yet provide adequate opportunities for the 
management of financial risks.  For all of these reasons, the Chinese securities markets do 
not presently appear to deliver to the Chinese economy the principle allocative or discipli-
nary functions that a developed securities markets can provide. 
 
  If these markets do not provide the fundamental economic benefits that securities 
markets can provide, one may ask, why do they exist and grow?  In this essay we suggest 
that they flourish because they provide valuable benefits both to investors, and to the Chi-
nese state.  Even without substantial legal system protection from exploitation, these mar-
kets do provide investors a way to participate in the rapid growth of Chinese economy.  In 
addition, these markets provide the following significant benefits to the country and its lea-
dership: (1) they provide a mechanism through which foreign capital can flow to support the 
SOEs that comprise the largest part of the firms listed on the mainland exchanges; (2) they 3 
 
 
provide a channel through which can flow a limited amount of investment from the very 
large reservoir of domestic family savings in order to do the same thing; (3) they serve as 
means to induce improvements in the management and governance of listed SOEs; (4) they 
provide to the leadership a possible option for future expansion of the role of private sector 
in financing enterprise, including both the existing state sector and the entrepreneurial sec-
tor of the economy; and finally (5) they provide in some measure the non-economic satis-
faction of locating a globally important center of finance on mainland China.  
 
  Thus, despite the limited economic importance of Chinese securities markets to the 
nation’s economy at the moment, they continue to command both international investors’ 
interest and the support of the country’s leadership.  The leadership has demonstrated its 
continuing commitment to building out the infrastructure that might allow Chinese securi-
ties markets to play a greater role in the future in its extended effort to restructure the Chi-
nese share segmentation system (touched on below in Section 1.1.) and in facilitating the 
continued development of instruments of modern finance (see Section 1.5).  The following 
essay aims to assist interested readers in thinking about the future of these markets. 
 
In Part I, we provide a descriptive report on the current state of the Chinese securi-
ties markets, discussing their place in the national system of finance, their current size and 
scope, their interesting relationship to the Hong Kong securities market and the gradual de-
velopment of new tools of securities investing in China.  In Part II, we discuss the current 
regulatory environment of these markets, focusing on the structure and operation of the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which has a powerful role in control-
ling these markets, access to listing shares on them, and supervision of all the institutional 
actors on them.  In Part III, we discuss the corporate governance of listed firms, including 
both the formal or legal system of corporate governance and, more importantly, the role of 
the Chinese Communist Party in the internal affairs of listed companies.  In Part IV, we 
conclude with observations concerning the fundamental contradiction between the PRC se-
curities markets top-down design and control on the one hand and, on the other hand, their 
possible effectiveness in efficient capital allocation, in risk management and as a tool of 
discipline. We discuss the factors that may someday weigh on the perceived need of the 
leadership to address this contradiction.   
 
 
PART I.   THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHINESE SECURITIES 
MARKETS TODAY 
 
  The Chinese securities markets constitute an impressive accomplishment.  The tech-
nological, legal and human infrastructure supporting these markets has been created from 
almost nothing two decades ago.  While they remain a work in progress, that progress has 
been remarkable.  
  
  In assessing these markets, we begin by placing them in context of the formal sys-
tem that finances business activity in China today.  China’s system of formal finance is es-
sentially a bank-centered system primarily dominated by its four largest state-owned banks.  
China’s economy has a substantially higher ratio of bank credit to GDP (1.27 at the close of 4 
 
 
2009 according to the National Bureau of Statistic of China), than even the German, bank-
centered system of finance (.99).  Securities markets by comparison, while large by some 
measures, are small in economic terms.  Moreover when assessing the reported size of these 
markets, it is important to understand that what actually trades on the mainland exchanges 
(and in fact what, until quite recently was legally tradable on them) is in almost all cases a 
very small percent of the outstanding shares. (See e.g. the analysis of the holdings of the 
shares in ICBC bank, China’s largest bank, reported below).  
 
  Expressed in terms of proportion of financial assets rather than percentage of GDP, 
data for 2006, confirms the relatively undeveloped state of the mainland securities markets.   
According to CSRC data for that year the total value of securities in the PRC (equities and 
bonds, including treasury bonds) constituted just 22% of total financial assets, while in the 
U.S., U.K., Japan and Korea those percentages were far higher (82%, 71%, 62% and 75%, 
respectively)(CSRC Report, 2008: 237).  More recent data compiled by McKinsey & Co for 
year 2008 reported in Table 1 below is consistent with this view.  China appears on this data 
to have a substantially higher proportion of financial assets in bank deposits than any other 
region.  Moreover this table most probably exaggerates the importance of securities markets 
in China by using market capitalization data without adjusting for the very thin float of 
listed firms, which we discuss below.   
 
Table 1 
     
 
  As we noted, an accurate understanding of the scale and scope of the Chinese securi-
ties markets must take into consideration the on-going effects of the now reformed share 
segmentation system that until recently limited the number of shares of each listed SOE that 5 
 
 
could be traded on an exchange.  Therefore, we begin our discussion of the markets with a 
brief description of that reform.  Those familiar with the well-known share segmentation 
system and its now largely completed reform, may safely move directly to Section 1.3.  
 
1.1   Background: The Share Segmentation System and Its Reform  
 
  Among the signal marks of the program of liberalization that was initiated in 1978 
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping was its pragmatism and gradualism.  Among the 
steps taken to ensure that corportization of certain state sector production facilities could be 
safely tried, while not engendering unforeseen complication, was the adoption of a plan 
strictly to limit the potential non-state ownership of shares of the corporations that were to 
be formed from state and province production facilities. Thus newly incorporated enterpris-
es carved from state assets in the 1990s were authorized by the State Council to issue shares 
pursuant to an elaborate share segmentation plan.   
  
  Under the share segmentation scheme that governed the listing of shares on securi-
ties exchanges, a majority of shares of SOEs (which from the beginning and today consti-
tute most of the companies listed on the exchanges) would be non-tradable and held by in-
stitutions that were directly or indirectly controlled by the government. The minority of 
shares that were to be tradable were themselves broken down into A shares and B shares on 
both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  The A shares constitute the 
vast majority of shares traded on these exchanges, are traded in renminbi on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges and originally could be purchased only by Chinese nationals or 
institutions.  B shares are traded on the same exchanges but were listed in US dollars in 
Shanghai and HK dollars in Shenzhen; they could be purchased originally only by foreign 
nationals or institutions (now they can be purchased by Chinese nationals as well).
1  In addi-
tion to A and B shares, some larger Chinese firms, seeking access to foreign capital, have 
received (from the CSRC) permission to list on foreign exchanges. Stocks traded on these 
exchanges are denominated H shares (Hong Kong Stock Exchange), N shares (NYSE), L 
shares (LSE) and S shares (Singapore Exchange) and carry the same voting and cash flow 
rights as A shares.   
  
  Importantly, in addition to the segmentation of shares into A and B shares, Chinese 
shares were distinguished by the nature of the holder.  Shares could be either (1) pre-IPO 
shares issued in connection with the “corporitization” of the assets to (a) instrumentalities of 
the state – such as a Ministry, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (“SASAC”) or a provincial or municipal governments; or (b) to certain legal 
persons (principally the parent of the listed SOE, which itself will generally be controlled 
by a province or municipal body; or (2) shares issued in or after the IPO to Chinese nation-
als or institutions (for example, the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, “QFIIs”).  At 
least prior to the recent reform described below, the pre-IPO shares issued to state or munic-
                                                 
 
1 B share prices traded at prices below the same shares trading in A shares.  But when Chinese na-




ipal entities or to SOE management as part of the IPO process were generally classified as 
“C shares” and were not tradable on the exchange.  Non-tradable shares (“NTSs”) could 
only be transferred to legal persons (including in recent years foreign strategic investors) in 
private placements with the prior approval of both SASAC and the CSRC.   
  
  Prior to the completion of share segmentation reform, significantly, with respect to 
every listed SOE ― and, most of the firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are SOEs, 
recent estimates varying between 70% and 80% (Chen, Firth and Xu, 2009) ― NTSs signif-
icantly outnumbered the proportion of shares that are tradable. According to CSRC data, for 
example, at the end of 2004, there were 714.9 billion shares outstanding of all listed Chi-
nese companies of which 454.3 billion or 64% were non-tradable.  Thus, a fact of funda-
mental importance is that the trading market on the Chinese securities exchanges has 
represented only minority interests.  Generally for most listed firms control exists in one or 
more state affiliated firms or entities.  For a relatively small minority of listed firms control 
exists in an individual, family or small group.  
 
  The non-tradability of control blocks has been deemed undesirable and the CSRC 
attempted for several years to reform this structure.  After several failed attempts to do so, 
the CSRC has now largely completed its program in which most NTSs have been converted 
to shares that may be traded on the exchanges. The state-owned shares are now legally ca-
pable of being gradually floated to the open market according to relevant rules.
2  
  
The completion of the share segmentation reform raises a new series of economical-
ly interesting questions, however: will the state in fact dissolve its control blocks through 
secondary market sales of formerly NTSs? If so, the control of which firms will be put on 
the market and when?  It seems highly unlikely that the state will allow control over key 
elements of the economy, e.g., finance, transportation, energy, communications, and natural 
resources, to pass into the market.  And with respect to less vital SOEs, the state may raise 
capital by sale of state-owned shares while retaining blocks of 20%-25% which ordinarily 
would be deemed sufficient to thwart a market based change in corporate control.   
 
Thus while the completion of the NTSs reform removes a formidable impediment to 
the development of an effective securities market, it remains to be seen if, when and with 
respect to which firms the reform will be operationalized.  
 
1.2    Growth in Market for Large Company (SOEs) Shares 
 
                                                 
 
2 Article 27 of “The Administrative Measure of Share Segmentation Reform of Listed Compa-
nies” issued by the CSRC in September 2005 requires that (1) the NTSs cannot be publicly traded or trans-
ferred within 12 months after the implementation of the reform proposal of NTSs adopted by the listed com-
pany; (2) with regards to these NTSs shareholders who own more than 5% shares of a listed company, after 
the expiration of the above required 12-month period, they are not allowed to sell more than 5% of shares 
converted from NTSs on a stock exchange within 12 months and are not allowed to sell more than 10% of 
shares converted from NTSs within 24 months.  7 
 
 
  The mainland Chinese stock exchanges are now quite large. By close of June 2010, 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges together listed 1,891 companies. The majority 
listed companies were SOEs.
3  Using the market capitalization metric, with its weaknesses, 
the two mainland Chinese exchanges would have together constituted the fourth largest ex-
change in the world at the close of June 2010. At that time, total market capitalization of 
both markets equaled US$2,877.6 trillion, about one quarter of the size of the NYSE.   
While in the context of the Chinese securities markets, market capitalization figures may 
mislead as much as inform, still the numbers are impressive.  Daily trading volume on both 
markets averaged US$33.4 billion as of April 30, 2010.
4  Again, measured in total market 
capitalization, the comparative recent growth rates of these exchanges and their volatility 
appears remarkable.  Comparative data for the periods of 2006 through 2009 is set forth in 
Table 2.  
 
     T a b l e   2  
Global Stock Market Capitalizations and Percent Changes 
 
   Stock Market Capitalization  Percent Changes 







 (US$  in  millions)   
NYSE 11,837,793.30  9,208,934.10  15,650,832.50  15,421,167.90  ↑28.5%  ↓41.2%  ↑1.5% 
Nasdaq 3,239,492.44  2,396,344.30  4,013,650.30  3,865,003.60  ↑35.2  ↓40.3  ↑3.8 
London SE  2,796,444.32  1,868,064.80  3,851,705.90  3,794,310.30  ↑49.7  ↓51.5  ↑1.5 
Hong Kong SE  2,305,142.79  1,328,768.50  2,65,416.1  1,714,953.30  ↑73.5  ↓49.9  ↑54.8 
Shanghai SE  2,704,778.45  1,425,354.00  3,694,348.00  917,507.50  ↑89.8  ↓61.4  ↑302.7 
Shenzhen SE  868,373.99  353,430.00  784,518.60  227,947.30  ↑145.7  ↓54.9  ↑244.2 
Singapore SE  481,246.70  264,974.40  539,176.60  384,286.40  ↑81.6  ↓50.9  ↑40.3 
Korea SE  834,596.47  470,797.30  1,122,606.30  834,404.30  ↑77.3  ↓58.1  ↑34.5 
Bombay SE  1,306,520.21  647,204.80  1,819,100.50  818,878.60  ↑101.9%  ↓64.4%  ↑122.1% 
_________________________ 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges 
 
  In recent years, the mainland exchanges have been active sites for raising new capi-
tal.  Indeed, according to data collected by the World Federation of Exchanges, the Shang-




                                                 
 
3 As of 2000, Tam (2002) put the number at 90%. Liu and Sun (2003) put the number at 84%. See 
Clark (2008).  A recent study looked at the period of 1999-2004, consisting of 6,113 samples and it con-
cluded that the state directly and indirectly acted as major controlling shareholder at 79.7% of firms. See 
Chen, Firth and Xu (2009).  As of close of 2007, it appears that 65% of these listing were SOEs (and essen-
tially all of the largest firms).  In 2006 there were 14 new listings on the Shanghai Exchange, all of which 
were SOEs. 
4 The Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index which has a base (1991) value of 100 started 
2006 at less than 1500.  It peaked at 6,124.04 in October 2007 and then began to decline steeply.  It dipped 
below 2000 in late 2008 and then began to recover.  By early 2010 it stood at slightly more than 3000 and 





Market Capitalization of Newly Listed Shares 
 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
(US$ in millions) 
Shanghai SE  14,438  3,140  223,322 1,576,732  92,118  99,924 
Shenzhen SE  8,536  1,634  23,691  74,655  38,769  71,450
Hongkong SE  37,347  98,292  102,941  155,199  28,767  95,235
NYSE  118,944 135,719 192,412 244,515 207,612 64,810
LSE  52,468  322,269 131,137 144,674  77,560 24,437
Tokyo  SE  87,832 110,399 81,982  35,969  40,106 18,062
_____________________________ 
Source : www.world-exchanges.org/statistics  
 
 
1.3   Concentration, Liquidity and Pricing Efficiency  
   of the Shanghai Stock Exchange   
 
  The largest SOEs dominate trading on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Of more than 
800 listed firms as of June 2010, the ten largest firms represent 39.5% of the exchange’s 
total market capitalization. The two largest listed firms – PetroChina Company Limited 
(“PetroChina”) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”) together account 
for approximately 20% of the market capitalization of the entire exchange as of the end of 
June 2010.
5  The Shanghai Exchange is substantially more concentrated than either the New 
York Stock Exchange or the Tokyo Exchange, but currently about the same as the London 
Exchange.  
 
Table 4  
Market Concentration  
Percentages of Total Market Capitization Represented by Largest Ten Firms 
 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
NYSE  19.6% 16.4% 16.1% 19.3% 20.1% 15.7% 
London  SE 40.2% 40.9% 37.1% 38.2% 46.3% 41.3% 
Shanghai SE  29.0%  32.6%  56.6% 51.6% 49.0% 41.2% 
Tokyo  SE  18.1% 18.1% 20.1% 18.5% 18.3% 17.6% 
_________________________________________________ 
Source : World Federal of Exchanges: www.wfe.org/statistics 
 
  As we suggested earlier, market capitization figures of the Chinese exchanges must 
be interpreted carefully because of the large blocks of untraded (albeit now legally tradable) 
shares in virtually every listed firm.  Consider, for example, the share ownership structure 
of ICBC Bank, the second largest market cap listing on the Shanghai stock exchange. In 
October 2006, ICBC, the state-owned bank, simultaneous listed and distributed a minority 
block of its shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, in 
                                                 
 
5 The equity market cap of PetroChina and ICBC accounted for 11.93% and 7.33%, respectively, 
of the market capitalization of the entire Shanghai Stock Exchange as of June 30, 2010. (Shanghai Stock 
Exchange Statistics). 9 
 
 
what proved at the time to be the world largest IPO, generating approximately US$21.9 bil-
lion in proceeds. 
  As of June 30, 2010, ICBC bank had more than 334 billion shares outstanding;  
24.87% of its outstanding shares are H shares listed and traded on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange.  The reminder of its shares, following the completion of share segmentation 
reform are A shares technically tradable on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  But how much 
of this equity is actually public floated and controlled by non-state affiliate entities? Table 5 
sets forth shareholding of the top five shareholders of ICBC as of June 30, 2010.
6   
 
Table 5 
Top Five Shareholders of ICBC as of June 30, 2010 
 
Name of Shareholder  Nature of Shareholder Type of shares Total number of shares held 
Shareholding 
Percentage 
Central Huijin Investment Limited 
(1) State-owned  A  shares  118,316,816,139  35.4% 
Ministry of Finance of the PRC  State-owned  A shares  118,006,174,032  35.3% 
HKSCC Nominees Limited
 (2)  Foreign corporation  H shares  68,577,667,687  20.5% 
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.   Foreign corporation  H shares  13,180,811,324  3.9% 
American Express Company  Foreign corporation  H shares  638,061,117  0.2% 
____________ 
(1) Central Huijin Investment Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of China Investment Corporation, the Chinese state sovereign in-
vestment company.  
 
(2) Most retail and institutional investors hold their shares through a bank, broker or custodian who in turn hold them in an account with 
the Central Clearing and Automated Settlement System (CCASS) operated by Hong Kong Securities Clearing Co., Ltd. (HKSCC), a 
subsidiary of HKEx.   HKSCC Nominees Ltd., a subsidiary of HKSCC, is the registered shareholder of listed companies and acts as 
nominee for the account holders of CCASS.  The total number of shares held by HKSCC also included H shares held by PRC National 
Council for Social Security Fund. 
 
 
  From the table, we conclude the publicly owned ICBC shares tradable on the Shang-
hai Stock Exchange constitute less than 4.3% of ICBC A shares (since most of the 75.13% 
of ICBC shares that could in theory be traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are actually 
held by Central Huijin Investment Limited or the Ministry of Finance). One must look to 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to find more substantial private investment in ICBC 
shares.
7  There we find listed ICBC H shares constitute 24.87% of all outstanding ICBC 
shares.  One obvious conclusion from these figures is that in the case of ICBC Bank, the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange has been much more important than Shanghai as a source of 
new capital. Specifically, more than six times the capital raised by ICBC from investors on 
the Shanghai Exchange was raised by it on the Hong Kong Exchange.       
 
   ICBC’s share trading structure is not unique among the largest SOEs.  The propor-
tion of shares not controlled by state-affiliated entities of the largest firms on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange is typically quite small.  For example, as of June 30, 2010, 67.53% of the A 
shares of Bank of China was owned by Central Huijin Investment Ltd. and less than 2.35% 
                                                 
 
6 Shareholding percentage of each of top 6-10 ICBC shareholders was 0.1%. 
7 Chinese companies form a substantial part of the market capitalization of the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. As reported by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, by the end of June 30, 2010, the market capitali-
zation of China-related stocks on its main board reached 48.54% of the market capitalization.  10 
 
 




  Notably, the same cash flow rights usually command a somewhat higher price on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange than on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  This mainland pre-
mium is chiefly due, we believe, to impediments to low cost arbitrage between mainland 
markets and the Hong Kong market and to the huge demand for investment that the high 
personal or family savings rate in China generates.  The Hang Seng China A-H Premium 
Index, launched on July 9, 2007, tracks the average price difference between A shares and 
H shares for the largest and most liquid China enterprises with both A-share and H-share 
listings.  The Hang Seng China A-H Premium Index reached a high at 208 in January 2008 
meaning A shares are trading at an average premium of 108% above H shares and the index 
for the first half of 2010 was generally between 100% to 120%. Greater opportunities for 
arbitrage between these markets will, of course reduce or eliminate this difference.  
   
  The upshot of the fact that the trading markets in Shanghai are relatively thin and are 
more highly concentrated than most developed markets and that Chinese investors have 
highly restricted alternative investment opportunities, is that there is good reason to suppose 
that the prices reflected on the mainland markets are not a good signal of fundamental value 
of the shares or the firms listed on the exchange.  In fact, Chinese stock markets are fre-
quently described as highly volatile; price movements are notably synchronous (e.g. Morck, 
Yeung and Yu, 2000; Xie, Dai and Xu, 2003) and when market prices are compared to pric-
es at which control transactions occur it has been found that the control of a listed firm is 
traded by private contract on average at almost a 20% discount to market price. (Tuan, 
Zhang, Hsu and Zhang, 2007).  The reasonable conclusion is that traded prices are likely not 
a good signal of fundamental firm value.  
 
1.4  Product Innovation: Short Sales, Margin Sales and Indexed Futures 
  
  The securities markets in China have yet to develop a range of investment tools that 
are used elsewhere for investor risk management and which tend to reduce market volatility. 
These tools include short selling, margin buying and equity futures contracts. In recent 
years, however, steps have been going forward to carefully to introduce these investment 
techniques. In 2007 the State Council after long study, approved regulations formally per-
mitting trade in financial futures and options. The Chinese Financial Futures Exchange 
(CFFEx) was then formed under the authority of the CSRC. CFFEx spent the following 
years building an electronic platform for futures trading and a comprehensive set of proce-
dures to facilitate trading by brokers and discourage retail participation in a possible futures 
                                                 
 
8 As of June 30, 2010, 70% of the issued shares of Bank of China are A Shares.  67.53% A shares 
of Bank of China was owned by Central Huijin Investment Ltd. China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd., Alu-




9  It was not until January 2010, however, that the State Council approved a trial pe-
riod for the introduction of these investment tools.   
 
  Caution was also reflected in the introduction of short sales of equities and margin 
trading also in January 2010. Regulatory restrictions have been designed to control the ef-
fects of these innovations.  For example, only selected securities firms will be authorized to 
execute short sales or margin sales and they must use their own capital and shares to effect 
these transaction.  Thus, it is expected that no market in borrowed shares for the purpose of 
short sales will develop for the present at least. These restrictions will limit the use of these 
techniques and should be seen as an attempt to introduce these techniques in a guarded way.   
 
    The inability to sell shares short or to buy or sell futures in securities has starkly li-
mited the ability of Chinese institutional investors to hedge financial risk and has likely con-
tributed to excessive market volatility of the Chinese markets.  No doubt the financial mar-
ket turbulence during the period 2008-2009 made that period seem an inauspicious time in 
which to implement these desirable securities market innovations.  It is a sign both of the 
confidence of the leadership in the Chinese economy and their serious desire to build out 
the Chinese securities markets as large modern securities markets, that these changes were 
kick-started again in January 2010. 
 
1.5   Institutional Investors  
  
  Retail investors dominated China’s stock markets from their inception.  This fact 
has doubtlessly contributed to the relative price volatility of these markets. The dominance 
of retail investors, however, has gradually eroded in China, as QFIIs and domestic institu-
tional investors, such as insurance companies, a variety of managed investment funds, and 
the national social security fund have grown in importance.  In fact, by the end of 2008, 
the CSRC could report that institutional investors had for the first time became the domi-
nant force in the market, by holding 54.6% of market capitalization of all tradable shares 
in the domestic markets.
10 By comparison we note that institutional investors have been 
reported to represent seventy percent of the Hong Kong stock exchange and eighty percent 
of the New York Stock Exchanged.  
 
  The participation of QFIIs in the two mainland exchanges, however, remains quite 
limited. These foreign institutional investors, would no doubt be interested in channeling 
increasing amounts of foreign investment into the Chinese securities markets.  But their 
ability to do so is limited.  Following the initiation of the QFII program in 2003, qualifying 
institutions were permitted to invest in the A-share and the government bond markets.  
                                                 
 
9 Thus draft regulations established a minimum 10% margin requirement and a price for a single 
contract, at current price levels of the Shanghai-Shenzhen 300 Index (January 2010) of approximately RMB 
100,000.  
10  See CSRC 2008 Annual Report available from  




According to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange,  as of June 30, 2010, there 
were eighty-eight QFIIs approved in China, with an approved investment amount of 
US$17.1 billion.
11  As a percentage of market capitalization of trading volumes in the A-
share market, this quota represents only about 2.5% of former “A shares” and of course a 
much smaller proportion of post-market reform potential market capitalization.  
 
   A Chinese institutional investor deserving mention in this connection is the Na-
tional Council for Social Security Funds (NSSF) established in 2000.  NSSF is responsible 
for the investment of funds to support a future retirement system. The investment fund it 
manages comes from central government budget allocations, from investment returns it 
can earn and from liquidation of state-owned shares in SOEs.  That is, in order to help 
fund future pension system needs, the Chinese government has required that in connection 
with any share sale by one of one hundred thirty one SOEs, that the NSSF be funded with 
10% of the proceeds of such sales up to the limit of the state’s holding in the company. At 
the end of 2009, NSSF managed total assets of RMB 562.4 billion.  
 
1.6   Market Access for “Private” Firms: The SME Board & the GEM Board. 
 
  To a large extent, the growth of the Chinese economy is attributable not to the SOEs 
that dominate the Shanghai Stock Exchange, but to private and hybrid firms, that is those 
firms with private as well as local government involvement (as lenders, minority owners or 
business partners).  But formal sources of finance either bank loans or securities markets are 
difficult for private firms in China.  (Shen, Shen, Xu and Bai, 2009).  These firms have 
largely, but not completely, been excluded by the CSRC from listing on the stock exchanges.  
These firms have largely, but not completely, been excluded by the CSRC from listing on 
the exchanges.  While there are about 570 private companies listed on the two Chinese 
stock exchanges, representing 34.8% of the total number of all listed companies, those firms 
represent only 12.2% of the market capitalization (Shanghai Stock Exchange, August 10, 
2009. 
 
  Private firms have tended not been approved for listing by the CSRC for a variety of 
reasons.  First, of course, is the fact that the fundamental mission of the securities markets at 
least for the first fifteen years of their existence has been to support SOEs with additional 
capital. Especially in the first years of the exchanges, allocation of listings were heavily in-
fluenced by the capital needs of inefficient province level SOEs. Second, the CSRC deems 
itself charged to protect investors from excessively risky companies. Thus an unwillingness 
to approve listings for private firms may, in part,  reflect a belief that these firms will on av-
erage be more risky than existing state-affiliated enterprises.  Third, these smaller more en-
trepreneurial enterprises may lack political patrons, which in a system (and a culture) that is 
inevitably affected by political and personal networks, may be a significant disadvantage.  
Finally, the under representation of small and growing private firms may in part reflect an 
ideological bias against “private” wealth building.  Whatever the source of the bias, given 
                                                 
 




the fact that, as a class, private or hybrid firms represent the greatest prospect for substantial 
economic growth, the failure of the securities markets to provide finance to this segment 
must be deemed as a substantial current weakness. The leadership has recognized this fact 
and approved substantial steps to address it.  The CSRC has two initiatives in that respect.  
In 2004, a Small and Medium Enterprises Board (the “SME Board”) was opened in Shenz-
hen and more recently a Growth Enterprise Board (“GEB Board”) was opened on the same 
exchange.   
 
  The SME Board has met with some success. Private enterprises have a very signifi-
cant presence on the SME Board.  They are said to represent approximately 76% listed 
companies as of October 2005 (Zhang 2005). By June 2010, 437 firms had listed shares on 
this board.  Moreover, reportedly the annual average revenue growth rate of these firms was 
30 percent and growth rate of net profit was reportedly 18.5%.
12 However, in many respects 
the listing standards for the SME board are similar to those of the bigger boards.  The SME 
Board requires companies to have a minimum RMB30 million of accumulated net profits in 
the three years prior to listing. This rather importantly limits its utility to smaller entrepre-
neurial firms.  
 
  The CSRC’s second, more recent and more substantial step to try to begin to afford 
better access to capital markets to non-state enterprises was reflected in the first IPO in Oc-
tober 2009 on the new Growth Enterprise Board (“GEB” also sometimes referred to as 
“ChiNext”) of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  This Board has been designed to function 
much as the NASDAQ market does in the U.S., providing public capital to entrepreneurial, 
especially high tech firms. One aspect of this initiative is to provide a potential exit channel 
for venture capital funded enterprises, thus further encouraging the development of a PRC 
venture capital business.  Access to the GEB market will be overseen by a special review 
committee, which committee will presumably be professionally familiar with the special 
character of entrepreneurial and venture financed backed firms.  The standards for listing on 
the GEB are lower than the SME Board: a minimum RMB10 million in retained earnings
13.  
Nevertheless, in contrast to similar markets in other countries, companies that apply for the 
listing on the GEB must already be profitable, a test that neither Amazon nor Ebay, for ex-
ample, would have been able to satisfy.  Thus even these innovative small company boards 
may reflect a strong regulatory bias against more risky enterprises.  This bias may be appro-
priate in a system with a weak information environment, but it does limit the benefits that 
entrepreneurial activity can provide.  
 
  The first batch of twenty-eight selected firms selected for listing on the GEB went 
                                                 
 
12 China Global Times, March 25, 2010.  http://china.globaltimes.cn/editor-picks/2009-
05/432813.html 





public on October 30, 2009 to warm market acceptance.
14  As of June 2010, ninety compa-
nies were listed on the GEB.  
 
1.7   The Absence of a Substantial Market for Commercial Bonds  
 
  From the perspective of more highly developed financial markets, a notable feature 
of the Chinese securities markets is the practical absence of a market for commercial bonds 
and indeed a very small bond market even when government bonds are included.   
 
  For example, at the close of 2006, the PRC bond market was reported to equal just 
35.3% of China’s GDP.  Comparable international bond market numbers demonstrate the 
undeveloped nature of the Chinese bond market: Japan (201.0%), the U.S. (188.5%), U.K. 
(140.5%), Korea (125.1%), and Germany (69.0%). (CSRC Report: 245).  The existing bond 
market is heavily dominated by treasury bonds and financial institutions bonds. Huang and 
Zhu report that there are primarily four types of bonds in the domestic Chinese bond mar-
kets: Treasury bonds (they estimate at 2,149 billion yuan in late 2006), central bank notes 
(2,931 billion yuan), financial bonds (2.097 billion yuan), and commercial bonds (170 bil-
lion yuan).  Thus the bond market supplies only a tiny portion of the capital available to 
non-financial firms.  The CSRC gives somewhat different estimates but the proportions are 
about the same.  It estimates treasury bonds at 53.3% of the market and bonds of govern-
ment owned financial institutions at 37% at the end of 2007 (CSRC Report: 246). The 
CSRC reports that only 4.2% of the small PRC bond market represents what it classifies as 
“corporate bonds”, and most of that amount represents the small short term commercial pa-
per market at 3.7%.  Reportedly, only .05% of the bond market represents bonds issued by 
listed companies. When coupled with the very limited ability to hedge equity investments 
through derivative or futures trading, one can see the job of insurance company investment 
managers as very challenging in China.  
 
  China’s lack of a substantial bond market does not make it an outlier among devel-
oping nations, however.  As Table 1 shows, India, and Russia both have small bond markets.  
But neither of these countries has developed their economy or the formal institutions of cap-
ital markets as consistently as has China.  Therefore, one is entitled to wonder why this as-
pect of capital market development has not made more progress in China?  A possible an-
swer might involve a desire to protect the large, state owned banks from bond or money 
market competition.  Should a substantial bond market be available for long or short term 
debt, presumably the strongest credits would tend to migrate there, leaving weaker creditors 
for the subsidized banking system.
15 In addition bank lending may appear to the leadership 
                                                 
 
14 According to Caijing (October 26, 2009), a total of 188 companies applied to list on the GEB 
and about 70 percent of the applicants are from the electronics, new materials, alternative energy, biomedi-
cine and other emerging sectors.  
15 Something rather like this happened in U.S. banking following the great growth in the U.S. 
commercial paper market starting in the late the 1960s.  Strong credits such as General Electric, Ford, 
GMAC and other leading firms of the period migrated from bank revolving credit lines to commercial paper 
markets to satisfy much of their working capital needs. (Johnston 1968; Handal 1972). Indeed the decline in 
commercial lending that followed over an extended period would appear to be one of the business drivers for 15 
 
 
to be superior to a commercial bond markets because bank lending is arguably more easily 
susceptible to influence by government officials than would be a bond market – both with 
respect to allocating capital in the first place and with respect to controlling the conse-
quences of a default.    
 
 
PART II.   THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT: THE CSRC. 
 
  Prior to 1992, China’s infant securities markets had been lightly regulated by local 
governments and the local branch offices of the People’s Bank of China (the “PBOC”). Fol-
lowing the establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 1990 and 1991, 
respectively, the State Council, in order to consolidate the complex, multilayered and frag-
mented institutional framework for securities trading, in fall 1992 formed the Securities 
Committee of the State Counsel (the “SCSC”) and the CSRC, as the SCSC’s executive arm. 
These new entitles were charged to create a centralized supervisory framework for securi-
ties issuance and trading in China.   
 
2.1  CSRC’s Dual Mandate: Advance State Policy While Also Protecting Investors. 
As an executive arm of State Council, the CSRC has a primary obligation to ad-
vance state policy and programs.  These state aims importantly include successful imple-
mentation of the state corporitization program, the development of the securities markets 
and the modernization of management of corporatized state-owned firms.  In connection 
with its effort to supervise and guide the development of modern securities markets, the 
CSRC has adopted approaches that in some respects appear to have been influenced by the 
structure and policies of the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  In other re-
spects, however, the CSRC’s mission and the nature of the PRC governmental structure re-
quires quite different treatment of problems than that of western securities regulators.  
 As set forth in the PRC Securities Law of 2006, the CSRC’s functions are broad in-
deed.  They are to: (1) formulate relevant rules and regulations to supervise and administer 
the securities markets and exercise the power of examination or verification;
 16 (2) supervise 
and administer the issuance, offering, trading, registration, custody and settlement of securi-
ties (including granting or withholding permission to issuers to distribute shares); (3) super-
vise and administer securities activities of securities issuers, listed companies, securities 
firms, securities investment funds, securities trading service institutions, stock exchanges 
and securities registration and clearing institutions; (4) formulate the standards for securities 
practice qualification and code of conduct and carry on the supervision and implementation; 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
the evolution of the “originate to securitize” model of banking that ultimately played an important role in the 
financial crisis of 2008.  
16  Under the CSRC’s direct supervision, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange are the major SROs in China. The CSRC holds the power to appoint and remove major officers of 
the exchanges.  The stock exchanges themselves are not empowered with formal investigative and sanction 
authorities over frauds on the market; the CSRC is. But the CSRC’s enforcement capacity is still restrained 
and the SROs may offer considerable depth and expertise regarding market operations and practices. 16 
 
 
(5) supervise and examine information disclosure relating to securities issuance, offering 
and trading; (6) offer guidance for and supervise activities of securities industries associa-
tions; (7) investigate and punish violations of any securities laws and administrative rules; 
and (8) perform any other functions and duties in accordance with law or administrative 
rules. 
  The CSRC is widely regarded as one of China’s most highly professional regulatory 
bodies. It has been an active and effective participant in guiding market development, im-
proving market transparency and in encouraging the development of modern management 
techniques.
17  Perhaps its role differs from that of the SEC most fundamentally in that, as an 
executive arm of the State Council of the PRC, it has assumed the power to control access 
to the securities markets by all potential issuers of shares.  Thus it acts as a gatekeeper to 
public finance available both in the IPO and the secondary issuance markets.  We turn to 
this aspect of CSRC functioning first and then to its disclosure policy and enforcement ac-
tivities.  We discuss the CSRC’s role in modernization of management later, when we dis-
cuss corporate governance of listed firms.  
 
2.2   Access to Listing:  The Merits Based Regulatory Approach.  
 
  2.2.1 CSRC as Gatekeeper  
 
  In its role of overseeing the development of the Chinese securities markets, the 
CSRC seeks to advance state interests by limiting the number of new listing and number of 
shares to be issued in any period, and by selecting those applicants for initial public offer-
ings or secondary issuances on the PRC securities exchanges.  In doing so, it exercises me-
rits based discretionary judgment.
18   
 
  A number of considerations affect this selection process.  In the earliest phase of the 
process of corporatization and issuance of shares in China, decisions concerning which 
companies would be permitted to sell listed shares were heavily influenced by local politics.  
In this period, listing opportunities were allocated among provincial governments on a quo-
ta basis. The allocation of this opportunity to local firms was made by local governments 
which would be reviewed by the CSRC, who would give final approval.  Provincial gov-
ernments tended to allot these allowances so as to raise money for the SOEs that were the 
most significant local employers and were most in need of capital. Thus, as it happened, un-
derperforming SOEs were disproportionately selected for listing at the expense of more dy-
namic entrepreneurial companies (Tao, 2006).  During this period approximately 949 SOEs 
were listed on the domestic stock exchanges while only 30 private firms were permitted 
access to the securities markets (Zhang, 2000).   
 
                                                 
 
17 See CSRC Report (2008) for a comprehensive review of its activity.   
18 Article 12, Provisional Administrative Measures of Stock Issuance and Trading (1993); Article 
10, the PRC Securities Law of 2006. 17 
 
 
  This allocation system was modified in 1998 and abandoned in 2001.  Currently, in 
determining whether to permit access to listing the CSRC deploys a process in which a 
committee — the Public Offering Review Committee (the “Committee” or the “PORC”) 
makes a recommendation respecting access to listing.  The PORC is comprised of a minori-
ty of CSRC officials and a majority of outside experts in law, accountancy and financial 
markets.  The decisions of PORC may take into account all relevant considerations, includ-
ing the issuer’s qualifications, use of proceeds, legitimacy of business operation, competi-
tive strength, assets’ quality, profit generating ability, independence, information disclosure 
and corporate governance.
19  The following table sets forth the review results of companies 
seeking to issue shares from 2004 to 2007. 
 
Table 6: PORC Review Results (2004-2007) 
 
Year  Number of Applications  Number of Approved 
Applications 
Number of Rejected 
Applications  Rejection rate 
        2007  354              298  55  15.54% 
        2006  181  159  22  13.84% 
        2005  16  9  6  37.5% 
        2004  177  119  58  32.77% 
_______________________ 
Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange (2008) 
 
  Looking more closely at rejections for the year 2007, one notes that of the 55 re-
jected applications 38 were for initial public offerings and seventeen were requests for sec-
ondary offerings.  Among those rejected applications, sixteen were stated as being primarily 
due to PORC’s view of risky or impracticable plans for use of proceeds; fourteen rejections 
were primarily due to perceived over-reliance on business with the controlling shareholders 
or major clients and the lack of competitiveness or independence; eleven rejections were 
primarily due to poor accounting practices, such as inconsistent accounting policies, non-
compliance in revenue recognition, insufficient provisions and significant contingency is-
sues; eight rejections were primarily due to the failure to meet qualification requirements 
such as material changes of management in the reporting period; and four rejections were 
primarily due to insufficient or false information disclosure.  
 
  Thus formally the CSRC system for allocating listings appears to be moving away 
from political allocations towards economic merits based listing decisions.  There can be 
little doubt however, that both political and policy based factors continue to have a large 
impact on these decisions.  First, while geographical allocations to various provinces was 
formally abandoned in 2001 in favor of an independent merits based approach, a 2004 study 
found that the 2003 geographical distribution of IPO fund allocations was not significantly 
different than the distribution in year 2000. (Chen 2004).  Secondly, the number of new list-
ings itself during any period is subject to macro-level policy considerations. Thus, the 
CSRC may reduce or even eliminate for a time the number of IPOs authorized without re-
                                                 
 
19 The CSRC also has set up a review committee for Merger & Acquisition and restructuring ac-
tivities of listed companies in 2008 and a review committee for initial public offering on the Growth Enter-
prise Board in Shenzhen.  18 
 
 
gard to the investment quality of any pending applicant for listing.  For example, in order to 
accommodate the non-tradable shares reform, all IPO activities were held in abeyance from 
October 2004 to January 2005 and from July 2005 to May 2006.  Also in reaction to the 
world-wide financial crisis of 2008, in an effort to slow the descent of prices on the Shang-
hai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, all CSRC work on new IPO quietly came to a halt in 
mid-September 2008 until late June 2009.  
 
  Finally, while recent changes in the IPO listing process clearly appear to represent 
improvements (if one assumes that the system of access should allow investors access to 
those firms that have the highest risk adjusted future value) the improved system still leaves 
substantial room for inefficient allocations both because of human judgment error in being 
able to distinguish “good” bets from bad ones and from the possibility for corruption that 
gatekeeper systems inevitably invite.  
 
  2.2.2  IPO Pricing  
 
In addition to access itself the CSRC has a role in the setting of IPO prices.  The 
CSRC once set bounds on IPO offering prices by a formula in which average firm earnings 
over the last three years were multiplied by a floor rate (15 usually) and a ceiling rate 
(usually 20). Within the resulting range underwriters and issuers set an offering price.  But 
unsurprisingly, the setting of such prices, as well as access to the exchange listing itself, has 
been found to be affected by what might be termed “connections.”  Based on a study of 423 
PRC IPOs during period 1994 to 1999, Francis, Hasan & Sun (forthcoming) find that, on 
various measures of political connectedness  (e.g. corporate directors who are retired high 
level officials), “connected” firms were more likely to receive a higher than median P/E ra-
tio in the price setting process and thus a authority for a higher range of issuance prices.   
 
But not all firms are well connected; for most firms the setting of offering prices 
tends to be on the low side.  This of course is true in western securities markets too.   Un-
derwriters want happy investors and even issuers want share prices to rise initially to some 
extent.  Thus it is common to observe average price increases following an IPO.  But the 
degree of under pricing on the Shanghai exchange appears substantially greater than ob-
served in the western markets. Xiu and Liu (2008) found that in China, the degree of IPO 
under-pricing measured by the first-day return is higher than 100%, which is larger than al-
most all the documented IPO initial returns in other countries.  See also Tan (2006).  
 
  Perhaps responding to this apparent large systematic IPO under-pricing, at the close 
of 2004, the CSRC began to experiment with the introduction of a price inquiry mechanism 
and book-building process, which would seek to move towards an IPO price more reflective 
of market sentiment.  In accordance with these initiatives, IPO issuers, after receiving 
CSRC’s green light for share issuance, must initially inquire about appropriate IPO prices 
from at least twenty institutional investors (more if the issuance is planned at 400 million 
shares or more).  Presumably the range of P/E ratios that the CSRC will use setting IPO 19 
 
 
price ranges in specific cases will take these opinions into account.
20 
 
2.2.3   Mandatory Information Disclosure. 
 
The quality of information availability is of course a foundational condition for rela-
tively efficient price fixing on securities (or other) markets. Chinese statutory law mandates 
that issuers’ accurately disclose all material information and prohibits any material false 
statement or omission.
21 Disclosure obligations are periodic and continuous.
22  To be effec-
tive, a disclosure regime requires that the quality of information disclosed is good (truthful, , 
timely and material) and that when it is not that some sanction be enforced.  Despite these 
legal systems requirements, however, the credibility of information disclosed by Chinese 
listed companies is regarded as doubtful by investors and scholars (e. g. Aharony, Lee and 
Wong, 2000).  
 There are some efforts to improve the quality of information available.  A 2008 
study by Shanghai Stock Exchange found that disclosure violations represented approx-
imately 78% of all violations punished by CSRC and two stock exchanges for the period of 
1996-2007 (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2008).  An earlier Shenzhen Stock Exchange study 
covering the period 1993-2001 found that material omission and false disclosure were the 
two top categories of violations (Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2002). They represented 69.7% 
and 13.3%, respectively of the 218 violations discovered during that period.  The absolute 
number of violations disciplined does not however seem large (see section 2.4 below re. en-
forcement).  
 
  2.2.4   Would a Disclosure Based IPO System Be Feasible for China and    
 Beneficial? 
 
  For the reasons mentioned earlier (i.e. human bias or error in price fixing, the possi-
bility of both political influence and personal corruption), a system of full disclosure and 
market based offering prices would no doubt be the policy recommendation of most western 
law and finance experts.  But it should be acknowledged that a merits based securities regu-
latory system may offer benefits in a society in which financial information is not yet of 
high quality, retail investor sophistication is not high and market prices appear to be rela-
tively inefficiently set.  These conditions appear to obtain in China currently.  
 
                                                 
 
20 With the introduction of this system, it was found that some institutional investors “conspired” 
with underwriters during the initial consultation process to drive up initial offering prices, but thereafter 
withdrawing from the process to allow retail investors to invest at what the CSRC concludes may be artifi-
cially high prices.  The Regulator is now considering new measures to build up a more reliable IPO pricing 
process.  
21 Article 62, the PRC Securities Law of 2006. 
22 Periodic reports include annual reports, interim reports and quarterly reports. Ad hoc reports are 
primarily related to material events disclosure. 20 
 
 
Thus, while the CSRC has announced an intention to move towards a disclosure 
based system, as Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore are doing, until there is greater re-
spect for the integrity of financial statements, and greater evidence that prices are fixed in 
an efficient secondary market
23 we can expect movement towards disclosure based system 
to be unhurried. 
 
2.3.   Enforcement  
 
  It is a commonplace for legal scholars to note the critical role of enforcement in ef-
fective securities regulation (e.g. Coffee, 2007).  The difference between law as written on a 
page and law as implemented by active agents and courts can be great.  
Securities law enforcement is one of the CSRC’s major regulatory functions.
24  Pre-
scribed market misconduct includes: illegal stock offerings, misrepresentation and omission 
in connection with the offer or sale of securities, insider trading, market manipulation and 
professional (securities firm/accounting firm/law firm) misconduct in connection with the 
offer or sale of securities.
25 Among the recurring matters that give rise to enforcement activ-
ities of the CSRC are disclosure violations, securities firm misconducts such as misappropr-
iation of client funds and market manipulation.  Authorized penalties against public compa-
nies or securities firms include disgorgement, fines,
26 revocations of business licenses, or-
ders of business suspension and internal correction, and warnings or censure.  Fines,
27 an 
up-to a lifelong bar from the industry, and warnings are available against individuals, in-
cluding directors and senior management in listed companies. 
While it is empowered, it is difficult to say that the CSRC is as an effective en-
forcement body.
28  For the most part, CSRC enforcement activities are limited and its penal-
                                                 
 
23 We assert that the (relative) efficiency of secondary market prices is a condition for the optimal 
deployment of a disclosure based system because the overall character of price setting is what allows the IPO 
market to estimate value of new issues reasonably well.   
24  See Article 180 of PRC Securities Law of 2006. There is some controversy among Chinese 
academic commentators whether the CSRC as an institutional unit of the State Council (shiye danwei) not an 
administrative department of the State Council, is authorized under the Constitution to make rather apply 
rules.  See Clark (2008), citing Zhou, Zheng and Hui (1998). 
25 See “Interim Provisions on the Management of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks”, issued by 
the State Council, effective April 22, 1993; The PRC Securities Law of 2006, Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, effective January 1, 2006; The Regulation on the Administration of Futures 
Trading, State Council, effective April 15, 2007. 
26 The amount ranges from RMB100,000 (US$14,622 equivalent) to RMB600,000 (US$87,732 
equivalent), 1% to 5% of or 1 to 5 times of illegal proceeds.  
27 The amount ranges from RMB30,000 (US$4,386 equivalent) to RMB100,000 (US$14,622 
equivalent). 
28 It is suggestive that in a study of all voluntary tender offers, Tuan, Zhang, Hsu & Zhang (2007) 
found that an investor following a long arbitrage strategy on the date of announcement would not profit. The 21 
 
 
ties are mild.  While the number of CSRC enforcement actions has grown as the markets 
has grown, the number of such actions does not seem large.  In the early years, fewer than 
15 cases were investigated and adjudicated annually.  In recent years, the number of admin-
istrative prosecutions has increased to more than 40.  These numbers, however, are small.  It 
is suggestive, but little more than that, given the differences in the scale of U.S. financial 
markets, but in 2008 for example, it was reported that the SEC. brought 671 enforcement 
actions (SEC 2008). In 2007, the SEC filed 656 enforcement actions (SEC 2007).  In 2006, 
the total had dropped by about 9% to 574 enforcement actions compared to the prior year 
(SEC, 2006).
29  There are grounds to believe that in China powerful SOEs are treated lightly 
by the CSRC; despite making up a small portion of listed companies in China’s securities 
markets, private companies are more often sanctioned than SOEs.
30  But it is possible, of 
course, that the private firms may be less law abiding.   
In all events, the result in most CSRC enforcement cases in which a listed company 
is accused of wrongdoing is censure; fines are quite rare (Firth, Chen, Gao and Rui, 2005).  
Yet Donald Clark wisely notes that where senior officers of SOEs are state officials, as may 
be the case in many large SOEs, a censure may be an effective remedy because it is likely to 
have serious career effects.    
In recent years private actions by mislead investors have been permitted.  Enforce-
ment of securities private litigation in the PRC courts is a recent phenomenon.  The PRC 
courts have faced a problem similar to that of the CSRC: they need to provide access to in-
vestors claiming fraud often in connection with SOE issuance of shares, while at the same 
time considering the interests of state in front of massive private securities litigations.
31  
 
PART III.   LISTED COMPANIES: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
  WITH  CHINESE  CHARACTERISTICS 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
authors infer that information concerning the offers had fully been absorbed into prices before the an-
nouncement and that insider trading was the likely technique.  
29 In 2005, the SEC filed 629 enforcement actions. See SEC (2005). 
30 Liebman and Milhaupt (2008) posit that private firms may be less politically connected than 
state-owned firms, but they may also tend to have weaker governance. 
31 As a supplement to CSRC enforcement, since 2002 CSRC enforcement has been augmented by 
possible private actions for misrepresentation. Notice on Accepting Cases regarding Civil Tort Disputes 
Arising from Securities Market Misrepresentations, Supreme Court of People’s Republic of China, effective 
January 15, 2002.  In 2003, the Supreme Peoples Court indicated to lower courts that they could accept such 
actions if but only if the CSRC had imposed a sanction on the party defendant.  According to a recent news 
article, by the end of 2008, approximately 10,000 investors brought suits against more than 20 public com-
panies for claimed damages, totaling about  RMB800 million-900 million (US$117.0 million-US$131.6 mil-
lion equivalent).  Most cases were settled and about 90% of the plaintiffs were compensated. 
http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/zqyw/20090401/499677.shtml.  Additionally, in 2006, for the first time, the 




  It is generally thought that one of the institutional preconditions for the evolution of 
an efficient securities market is the existence of reasonable protections for investors against 
both the risks of ex post exploitation of their investment and of management incompetence.  
A potential source of such protections is the system of corporate governance.  By “corporate 
governance” we mean that set of authoritative rules or practices that define how and by 
whom power over the internal affairs of a business corporation is distributed, exercised and 
disciplined.  Of course, even countries with successful securities markets differ in the way 
in which and extent to which this protection is provided.  But the Chinese securities markets 
remind us that what is important is the assurance, not its source.  That is, it is not essential 
that such protections come from a legal system, although the legal system is the formal 
source of such protection in “rule of law” systems.  What is important is that investors 
perceive in a system a reliable set of practices that offers reasonable protections against ex 
post investor exploitation or management incompetence. 
 
3.1   Realism and the Governance of Internal Affairs in Chinese Corporations 
 
  Across the world, the topic of corporate governance receives attention from scholars, 
regulators and investors.  China is not different; both its scholars
32 and law makers (e.g. 
State Counsel, 2004) appear deeply interested in this topic.  The CSRC (e.g. CSRC, 2003) 
and the Stock Exchanges have addressed the topic of advisable corporate governance struc-
tures for listed companies.  In this discussion, the very special features of “corporate gover-
nance with Chinese characteristics” are not always emphasized.  Therefore, we begin our 
discussion by identifying the most significant aspect of these special characteristics.     
 
3.1.1   Government and Party Involvement with Internal Firm Governance 
 
   With its legal system of “corporatized” joint stock companies, shareholder voting, 
takeover regulation and derivative law suits, China appears formally to be sufficiently simi-
lar to European or other western “rule of law” societies to justify discussing its economic 
control systems in these terms.  As we discuss in this part, however, to treat these legal 
structures as representing the principal supports in the actual system of Chinese corporate 
governance would be a mistake.  Chinese corporate governance is fundamentally different 
from that in the west.  For Chinese listed firms, the formal system of board of directors, 
share-voting at meetings, of tender offers and of derivative law suits is of little importance 
in the actual system of power delegation, monitoring or discipline.  Rather, actual control 
over important internal affairs in Chinese listed firms is usually in the hands of a control 
structures operated by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”).  That system operates   
through several avenues.  In the largest firms it is operated through a combination of Minis-
try supervision and CCP Central Committee action.  For other listed firms, whether SOEs or 
“private” firms, that control operates through local, party designated committees that func-
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tion in each large firm
33 (Wei Yu 2009), as well as through the operation of local govern-
ment bureaucracies. (Fan & Huang 2010).    
 
  The firm-based party committee is an important structure in this regard.  This com-
mittee which will be headed by a party secretary, who will often sit on the company’s su-
pervisory board, will direct the voting of state controlled shares, will nominate both “inde-
pendent” directors and insiders, and will have significant influence in designating or dis-
missing the CEO.  As quoted by Howson (2009) from a 2006 interview in Caijing Maga-
zine, Mr. Jiang Chaoliang, the CEO of China Bank of Communications discussed the role of 
the Party in the operation of the bank as follows:  
 
What does the party committee govern? First, it is in charge of overseeing strategy. 
The government has a 65% [share interest in] Bank of Communications, and as the 
controlling shareholder, it has the power to propose strategic arrangements for the 
future development of the bank. Second, [the Party Committee] oversees human re-
sources…The Party Committee recommends to the Board of Directors, senior man-
agement candidates with the Board of Directors making the final decision. Third, the 
Party Committee oversees corporate social responsibility such as lawfully paying 
taxes, operating the business in accordance with law, and not being lawless and 
chaotic.  If the nation implements macroeconomic measures, [the Bank] must abide 
by these measures [and by implication it is the Party Committee that sees that it 
does]. (Hu, Cheng and Fu, 2006)  
Under the Constitution of the CCP, local party committees are charged to “super-
vise the members of CCP in the firm” and “implement higher party policy” (Article 31). 
The Constitution also provides that they “shall not be in charge of business operations of 
the firm.” (Article 32).  Nevertheless  as we noted  a member of the party committee 
usually sits on the board and it is not rare for the party secretary to serve as board chair. 
Chang and Wong (2004) found that in their large sample, 16.4% of firms the party secre-
tary served also as a senior officer of the company.  
In the largest firms, the governance role of the party is formally directed from the 
central organs of the party.  In December 2008, the Organization Department of CPC Cen-
tral Committee and SASAC issued a notice that key positions in fifty-three major SOEs 
must be appointed by the Organization Department of CPC Central Committee.  The list 
of affected SOEs included, among others, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Chi-
                                                 
 
33 Concerning party activities, Article 17 of the Company Law of 1993 stated that the activities of 
the local party committees of the CCP in a firm shall be carried out in accordance with the constitution of the 
CCP. Article 19 of the 2005 revised Company Law provides that “ the organizations of CCP shall be estab-
lished in companies in accordance with the constitution of the CCP so as to carry out their activities.” and it 
further adds “The companies shall provide party organization with conditions necessary to carry out their 
activities.”  Article 31 of the constitution of the CCP assigns the implementation function of higher party 
decisions to local party committees within firms, while Section 7 assigns the right to supervise party cadres 
and any other personnel explicitly to local party committees. In effect, this provision gives local party com-
mittees a supervisory and monitoring role in shareholding firms. (Chang and Wong 2004)  24 
 
 
na Construction Bank, Bank of China, China Life Insurance Co, China National Overseas 
Oil Company (“CNOOC”), China Telecom, China Oil & Foodstuff Co. (“COFCO”) and 
China Coal Co., Ltd.  Key positions, generally includes Chairman of Party Committee, 
Chairman of Board of Directors and President or CEO of SOEs.  In smaller enterprises the 
province level CCP designates local party committees.  
  Thus, while the process by which senior officers are designated, paid, and promoted 
or disciplined is formally a corporate process, in reality it is dominated by party processes. 
Presumably the designation of officers is based on a blend of considerations including 
both competence in administration and on political reliability or connections.  Relations 
between party committees in legal person shareholders and those in listed firms is an in-
ternal party matter which occurs behind a veil.  Sometimes apparently the party committee 
of a parent company may not appoint a committee in the subsidiary, but itself function di-
rectly in that capacity. (Wei Yu 2009) 
  In fact, as the quotation of Jiang Chaoliang suggests, in China’s listed SOE firms the 
formal board of directors has tended to play a secondary and formal role, with the party 
committee directing matters (through the board or otherwise) that it deems important.  It is 
reported that the party exercises its influence primarily on questions of strategy and per-
sonnel, going much deeper into the organization than simply designating the CEO. (Wong, 
Opper and Hu, 2004).  While they exercise great influence or control over corporate 
processes,  Party Committees owe no fiduciary duties to public shareholders.  Each Party 
Committee fits into the CCP governance structure which establishes appointment, goal 
setting, reporting and disciplinary structures. (Howson, 2009, Wei Yu 2009 and Pistor, 
2010).     
  Finally, with respect to smaller listed firms, the multi-dimensional involvement of 
local bureaucracies, which has been studied by Fan, Wong & Zhang (2007) and Fan & 
Huang (this volume), radically reduces the scope of areas over which even effective in-
struments of shareholder centered corporate governance could operate.  
 
  3.1.2   Does the State (Party) Governance Role Help or Hurt Public Shareholders?  
 
  The conventional scholarly view of this degree of political control of the internal 
affairs of a business corporation is that it will tend to be inefficient, diverting corporate re-
sources away from activities designed to maximize market returns towards the achievement 
of political objectives, including unnecessary employment. (e.g. Blanchard and Aghion, 
1996; and Hellman and Schankerman, 2000).  The policy implication of this view is unam-
biguous: reductions in political control should be associated with more efficient firms. 
Some studies find this effect in China for SOEs (presence of party secretary associated with 
poorer operating performance and lower labor productivity). (Wei Yu 2009)  
 
   Other scholars however, deploying the same theoretical framework have seen the 
question of CCP’s role in the corporate governance of Chinese listed firms more subtlety. 
They point out that while party committees certainly may involve the potential inefficiency 
of diversion of resources, or of excessive local employment, these committees may also 25 
 
 
have other positive effects from the point of view of the firm. They may assist management 
in securing limited resources (such as land, finance or possibly IPO allocations) and may 
limit both managerial agency costs and controlling shareholder expropriation. (Qian 1995, 
1996).  Moreover, the incentives of bureaucratic actors in China are to some extent aligned 
with long term investors interests, in that it is reported (e.g. Fan & Huang 2010) that a key 
metric in bureaucratic promotion is growth in GDP in the province or region. On this more 
textured view, the systemic effects of party committees or of local government actors on the 
efficiency of listed firms presents a difficult empirical question.  The studies done – based 
on accounting measures largely – are inconclusive; they suggest that for their sample as a 
whole party committees add value in constraining agency costs of management but are as-
sociated with inefficient levels of employment. (Chang and Wang, 2004). 
  
  Alongside its system of direct and indirect Communist Party control, China has de-
veloped the legal infrastructure of liberal corporate governance.  We turn now to a discus-
sion of this formal system.  We suggest that the legal system represents a supplemental sys-
tem that has two main purposes; it offers some assurance to foreign investors and may help 
in the modernization of management of listed SOEs.  In the following sections of this part, 
we discuss the current status of formal governance system. In Section 3.2 we discuss the 
command and control type of governance that originates chiefly in the CSRC. In Section 3.3 
we discuss formal legal governance rights of investors that will look familiar to those famil-
iar to with western corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
  
3.2  Top Down Corporate Governance in China: The CSRC Governance Role  
 
  In addition to other aspects of  CCP direct and indirect corporate governance power, 
the CSRC exercises significant authority with respect to establishment of certain gover-
nance standards and practices for listed firms.   
 
  3.2.1  The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies  
 
   In 2001 the CSRC issued its Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Compa-
nies.
34  In this Code the CSRC, in ninety-five number paragraphs, establishes standards for 
corporate governance. They include three paragraphs on Related Party Transactions (12-14), 
seven paragraphs on Behavior Rules for Controlling Stockholders, six paragraphs (22-27) 
on the Independence of the Listed Company, and three paragraphs on Disclosure of Con-
trolling Shareholder’s Interests (92-94). These rules of corporate governance plausibly seem 
directed towards protecting holders of state (formerly) NTS (and public shareholder inci-
dentally) by forcing disclosure by legal person shareholders.   
 
  In addition, the CSRC establishes rules for board procedure (44-48), for specialized 
committees of the board (52-58) and for Performance Assessments and Incentive and Dis-
                                                 
 




ciplinary Systems (69-72).  These rules seem directed to instructing management (and con-
trolling holders of legal person shares) about best management practices.  
 
  In fact, agencies of the State with large economic interests in residual earnings of 
listed SOEs would not be dependent on regulatory or judicial remedies in responding to 
mismanagement self-dealing or even for poor corporate governance practices.  If SASAC, 
as the body holding the residential state interest in many publicly listed SOEs, (or the Min-
istry of Finance in the case of the largest banks) or other agencies, learn of mismanage-
ment, they can and presumably are expected to act through government or Communist Par-
ty channels for redress or discipline.  Thus, a plausible explanation of the 2001 CSRC 
Corporate Governance standards is that in it the CSRC in effect provides such state agen-
cies with expert guidance or standards respecting the topics it covers. Simultaneously, 
these standards and practices may serve to induce listed SOEs (and other listed firms coin-
cidentally) to adopt more transparent and modern management and governance practices.  
 
 
3.2.2  Goals of CSRC’s Formal Governance Activities  
 
  More fully we suggest that in promulgating the Corporate Governance Code or other 
governance type regulations the CSRC seeks to advance three main aims:  
 
  First, the promulgation of sensible governance standards and practices will offer 
some assurance to foreign institutional investors on the Hong Kong or New York exchanges 
that investment in the large PRC SOEs listed on those exchanges constitutes an investment 
in a sensibly governed, modern commercial enterprise.  Currently, as we indicated above, 
Hong Kong appears to be more important for raising capital for such firms than Shanghai 
and those shares enjoy special class voting rights.   
 
  The second reason we suppose that CSRC engages in serious corporate governance 
activity, even though public shareholders have virtually no ability to enforce such standards 
(as we see below), involves the apparent aim of the leadership to construct the infrastructure 
for a modern securities market ― including statutory shareholder rights, fiduciary obliga-
tions and the modern standards of corporate governance ― as an option for future finance 
of SOEs.  The Share Segmentation Reform was an elaborate, time-consuming effort to 
make it possible to sell to public investors more of the State’s share interest in large, listed 
SOEs.  That effort must have been motivated by a desire to sell more stock to Chinese and 
to some extent overseas institutional investors.  Time will tell to what extent these sales will 
occur and with respect to which firms.  But, as with foreign investors in Hong Kong (as 
well as other overseas market), it is reasonable to expect that Chinese investors, especially 
institutional investors, will at that time be more likely to make further investments in SOEs 
at not-excessively discounted prices, if those firms appear to be governed by structures and 
“rights” consistent with those pertaining in other markets.       
 
  The third, and we suggest the most important reason that it makes sense for the lea-
dership to authorize the CSRC to promulgate (and care about) corporate governance prac-
tices, even though shareholders have virtually no way to enforce such standards, is that 27 
 
 
these standards may also be thought of as attempts to modernize management practices of 
SOEs and to coordinate CCP governance of firms.  Modernization of management of its 
state sector is important to China and the modern SOEs constitute a vital part of that sector.  
Listing standards on the exchanges and regulatory requirements by the CSRC can be seen 
both as a way to control undesirable management practices (such as self-dealing transac-
tions) that hurt the State as a shareholder (and incidentally hurt public shareholders) and as 
a way to encourage the development of better management techniques, such as better finan-
cial reporting or incentive compensation programs.
35  The CSRC as a specialist organization 
will obviously be more knowledgeable than decentralized Party Committees in establishing 
such things as transparent accounting standards or responsible management practices, in 
which the state and the party have an interest.    
 
3.3. The Limited Role of “Internal” Corporate Governance  
   in Chinese Securities Markets 
We turn now to the formal legal system of investor rights that appear in many re-
spects similar to shareholder rights in the U.S. or other western systems. We structure this 
discussion of the formal aspects of Chinese corporate governance around three primary in-
vestor governance mechanisms: the investors’ rights to vote, to sell shares thus facilitating a 
change in control and to sue.  
 
  3.3.1  Public Shareholders’ Right to Vote 
Turning first to the right to vote, we note that while all shares listed on Chinese se-
curities exchanges carry one vote, voting rights with respect to PRC listed firms must be 
understood in the shadow of the fact that, in essentially all cases, block holders hold con-
trolling blocks of shares.  In SOEs, the controller is typically state affiliated; in the 20% or 
so of listed firms that are not SOEs, the controller is an individual, family or affiliated 
groups of investors.  Thus, at first glance one would conclude that for public investors, cor-
porate voting is almost wholly immaterial.  This while largely true may not be entirely so.  
    Since one aim of the corporitization and listing process has been the attraction of 
capital – and as we show above, predominately foreign capital – to listed firms, it was seen 
as prudent, if not essential, to offer certain limited protections to foreign investors against 
the risk that a simple majority vote of shares could alter the character of their investment 
once it was made.  This protection was offered through a mandatory class voting right for H 
shares (and other overseas’ listing shares, if any) for the approval of transactions or charter 
amendments that would constitute an abrogation or variation in the rights of the H shares 
(or other overseas’ listed shares, if any).
36  The mandatory provisions identify the various 
types of corporate actions (identified in footnote below) that require a class vote of H shares 
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stock and options as compensation limited to 10% of outstanding shares). 
36 “Mandatory Provisions for Articles of Association of Companies to Be Listed Overseas” were 
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(or other overseas’ listed shares, if any) to be implemented.
37  The voting rule to determine 
such class votes is set at two-thirds of issued and outstanding H shares (or other overseas’ 
listed shares, if any). The class vote right can offer substantial protection to foreign inves-
tors in covered matters.  
 
  There exists another share voting protection of some significance which relates to 
related party transactions.  Under “Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Compa-
nies” first issued by the CSRC in 1997 and revised in 2006,  the authorization of any related 
party transactions that requires a shareholder vote, requires that only disinterested share-
holders vote.  In practice, listed companies have adopted this provision in their articles of 
association.  Not all related party transactions do require a shareholder vote, however. Ac-
cording to the Listing Rules of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, a shareholders’ vote is re-
quired in three cases: if  the transaction is approved by fewer than three “independent” di-
rectors or the transaction is large (greater than 5% of net assets and in excess of RMB 30 
million) or  there is a guarantee issued by the company to a related party.  
  
  Shareholder voting might in future become more important in Chinese corporate go-
vernance, now that share segmentation reform is largely completed. But it remains to be 
seen whether and when some firms will in fact distribute their formerly non-tradable shares 
to the public and how many shares will be distributed in this way.  Certainly these holders 
will have a substantial economic incentive to sell at market prices if, as has been the case in 
the past, the market prices are higher than the private market prices. 
 
  If and when control of some listed firms does become available in the securities 
markets, a number of very important corporate governance issues will be faced.  Some of 
these are mentioned below in connection with tender offers for control, but others will relate 
directly to shareholder voting.  Given the high cost of any shareholder initiated proxy con-
test, the most significant of these issues will be whether and on what terms shareholders 
might have access to the company’s proxy statement, which has been a contentious issue in 
                                                 
 
37 Art. 80 of Chapter 9 of the Mandatory Provisions provides the following situations shall be con-
sidered as a variation or abrogation of the rights of a certain class of shareholders: (1) the increase or reduc-
tion of the number of shares of that class of shares or the increase or reduction of the number of shares in 
another class which carry the same or more right to vote, right of distribution or other privileges; (2) the con-
version of all or part of the shares of that class to another class, or the conversion of all or part of the shares 
of another class into the shares of that class or the granting of such right of conversion; (3) the cancellation 
or reduction of the rights of that class of shares to receive dividends declared or accrued; (4) the reduction or 
cancellation of the preferential rights of that class of shares to receive dividends or to receive distribution of 
assets upon the liquidation of the Company; (5) the increase, cancellation or reduction of the share conver-
sion rights, options rights, voting rights, rights of transfer, preemptive rights and rights to acquire the securi-
ties of the Company of that class of shares; (6) the cancellation or reduction of the rights of that class of 
shares to receive payment payable by the Company in a particular currency; (7) to create a new class of 
shares which enjoys the same or more voting rights, distribution rights or other privileges than those enjoyed 
by that class of shares; (8) to restrict or increase the restriction on the transfer or ownership of that class of 
shares; (9) the granting of subscription rights or conversion rights in respect of that class or another class of 
shares; (10) the increase of the rights and privileges of another class of shares; (11) the reorganization of the 
Company as a result of which different classes of shareholders assume obligations otherwise than in propor-
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the U.S for some time, and whether successful proxy contestants can get reimbursement for 
some or all of the costs of the contest and under what circumstances.  
 
  3.3.2   Public Shareholder Inability to Participate in Disciplinary Tender Offers  
 
  In systems in which control over listed companies is in the market (“Contestable 
Control Systems”), the mechanism of hostile changes in corporate control has been treated 
both by scholars of law and of finance, as well as governance activists as the ultimate mar-
ket corrective for inefficiency of management (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991 and Bebchuk, 
1987). The theory is well-known.  The evolution of a disciplinary “market for corporate 
control” is often seen as a potentiality that can be useful in systems in which securities mar-
kets play a major financing role.  But as neat as the theory of a market for corporate control 
appears to be, there are substantial grounds to believe that the types of costs and imperfec-
tions that affect the efficiency of securities markets generally (e.g. principally information 
problems, agent’s incentive misalignment problems, and systematic limitations of human 
rationality) coupled with recurring periodic excess system liquidity, render this market far 
from perfect. (e.g. Schleifer and Summers, 1998 and Lipton, 1997).  Thus, in the U.S. there 
has long been a debate concerning how “free” the market for corporate control should be. 
There are of course numerous techniques open to any legal system for moderating the mar-
ket for corporate control when it is permitted to exist: approval of “takeovers” by substan-
tive regulatory agencies where there is a strong public interest in the industry;
38 enactment 
of “constituency” statutes or regulations that give non-shareholder constituencies a legally 
cognizable interest in such transactions (Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian, 2009);  autho-
rization of “poison pill” securities which give boards of directors certain powers to defend 
against unwanted takeovers (Kahan and Rock, forthcoming); and less powerful company 
law devices, such as staggered election of the board of directors. (Bebchuk, Coates and Sub-
ramanian, 2002 and Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005).  China need not address these secondary 
issues relating to a market in corporate control at this time because, while tender offers for 
control are legally possible, in fact there is virtually no market for corporate control.
39  “Ta-
keovers” play no disciplinary role in China today. 
 
  Some “change in control” transactions do occasionally occur in China, but they are 
in the form of contracts in which an acquirer contracts with the holders of some or all for-
merly non-tradable shares for transfer of controlling block of stock.  The State – that is both 
CSRC and often SASAC – must consent to such a transfer of control where state controlled 
shares are involved.  When these transfers involve listed companies, under CSRC regula-
tions, the buyer is required to extend a tender offer to all public shares at a price no less 
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financial institutions.    
39 In an apparent effort to aid public shareholders, the CSRC issued “Measures for the Administra-
tion of the Takeovers  of Listed Companies” in 2002 and revised in 2006, which for the first time contem-
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than that paid in the control transfer 
40 (Such a rule is called a mandatory bid rule and is 
common in the E.U. and under some state law systems in the U.S.). While the beneficial 
effect of mandatory bid rules is controversial (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1989), what is nota-
bly is that in China such tender offers, when they occur, are merely formal and have no 
economic effect at all.  
 
Professors Tuan, Zhang, Hsu and Zhang located just 24 instances of tender offers for 
shares of listed firms in China between June 2003 and December 2006. (Tuan, Zhang, Hsu 
and Zhang, 2007)  Of these seventeen tender offers were “mandatory” in character and of-
fered a price below the market price for the traded A shares!  That is, in these cases, the 
price per share paid for the control block was below market price for the traded shares! 
Thus the public tender offer required by the CSRC mandatory bid rule could be and was 
made at a below market price.  The authors report that on average the discount from market 
price offered was 19.6%.  Unsurprisingly, none of these offers closed. We might call these 
tender offers “phantom tender offers”, because they have the formal look of a tender offer, 
but have no economic substance.  The remaining seven cases of tender offers were cash 
tender offers.  All of these bids were in the petroleum & chemicals sector and all were in-
itiated either by Petro China or by Sinopec, the giant SOEs in the petroleum business. 
 
More interesting than the question why do buyers of control offer a price below 
market – having acquired control, they apparently saw no advantage in buying out the pub-
lic shares – is the question why do the original holders of control agreed to sell at substan-
tial discount to market price?  A standard answer, grounded in a belief in the fundamental 
efficiency of stock markets, would be that very large blocks often trade at a discount due to 
market illiquidity.  An alternative possible account of this phenomena would posit that the 
market price for non-controlling A shares is recognized by both buyers and sellers of con-
trol to be irrationally high on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, at least part of 
the time.  That is, there may at times be a bubble premium reflected in the market that more 
informed and rational buyers are unwilling to pay.  
 
  In all events, we observe that, even though the legal technology to govern tender of-
fers has been well developed by the CSRC, (Huang, 2008), at least for the present, tender 
offers for corporate control play little role in Chinese corporate governance.  The CSRC’s 
formal takeover regulation appears to be another example of the development of a future 
option available to the leadership. Whether disciplinary takeovers in fact will be observed in 
the future in China will turn on two factors.  First, will control of (some) listed firms actual-
ly become available on the market (i.e. will state affiliated holders sell control of SOEs into 
the market?) and second, should this occur, will the leadership  permit the management of 
listed firms to be determined by a market for corporate control processes.  That of course 
appears to be unlikely now or in the intermediate future. The more likely role for takeover 
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regulation is to offer some modest protection to minority shareholders as control blocks are 
in future shifted as part of industry consolidations or other restructurings.  Moreover, given 
the likely inefficiency of the pricing of shares on the mainland exchanges, even if share-
holdings were such as to make hostile takeovers feasible, there is doubt that they would 
serve useful public purpose at this time.  
 
3.4   Chinese Courts and Shareholders’ Right to Sue 
 
  3.4.1  The Institutional Contributions That Courts Can Provide. 
 
  While administrative agencies such as CSRC can act as powerful instruments in 
structuring and operating a system of market regulation, courts could supplement such ac-
tivity in useful ways.  Courts can give force and effect to abstract statements of law by de-
termining contested facts and declaring and enforcing rights and duties of managers, share-
holders or directors in those factual contexts.  Among the institutional advantages of courts 
are the following: (1) well functioning courts offer a professional commitment to make de-
cisions only in accordance with pre-existing law and to be unaffected by other matters; (2) 
they have expertise in the content of pre-existing law and in accepted professional tech-
niques of interpretation of it;  (3) they make decisions grounded in the facts of a particular 
case, which are determined in an unbiased manner; and (4) they often or usually provide 
written justification for their results.  In a judicial system in which courts function in this 
way, citizens know after a litigation has been determined that they have been heard by a dis-
interested judge with expertise who has ruled according to law.  In this way well function-
ing courts can provide a form of satisfaction even to parties who lose their disputes.  The 
reliable provision of these services can ex ante facilitate investment and more broadly con-
tracting among strangers.   
 
  As an arbiter of disputes between shareholders and those controlling the manage-
ment of the firm, courts could serve a corporate governance function either at the instance 
of government actors (e.g. administrative agencies) or at the instance of shareholders direct-
ly.  In fact since the 2006 amendment of the Company Law, Chinese courts have been  au-
thorized to adjudicate claims of director wrongdoing in so-called “derivative” lawsuits – 
that is a suit brought by a shareholder in the name and for the benefit of the corporation it-
self.
41  Such suits are brought against the corporate directors or officers who are alleged to 
have violated their duty and injured the company in some way.  
 
  Derivative lawsuits can be subject to abuse, but they can serve as an important con-
straint on corrupt behavior.  Generally, these suits can be useful even if directors are not 
frequently required to pay damages for wrongs in such lawsuits.  In the U.S., most such 
suits are settled through the payment of a relatively small payment from an insurance un-
derwriter.  Nevertheless, such suits are useful to investors because, ex ante, directors adjust 
their behavior knowing that in certain types of transactions they face a high probability that 
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their conduct will be subject to derivative litigation and thus close judicial review.  Thus the 
existence of this types of lawsuit and the legal infrastructure that permits them to be brought, 
can serve an important chilling effect on violations of the corporate directors fiduciary du-
ties.  
 
  3.4.2   “Fiduciary Duties” and Shareholder Suits in China 
 
   Formally, the corporate board of directors, under Chinese company law and that of 
most western countries, holds power over corporate managers; it is responsible for oversee-
ing the operation of the company.  If those individuals wrongfully injure the corporation 
under most systems they can be held responsible and in some jurisdictions, including China, 
they may be held liable for such harm in a suit brought by shareholders on behalf of the 
corporation itself. Most such suits would charge a violation of a general duty to try in good 
faith to undertake transactions only in a good faith effort to advance corporate purposes. 
Such a duty is generally characterized as the fiduciary duty of loyalty.  As part of the early 
corporatization movement, the first modern PRC Company Law of 1994 did expressly state 
that officers and directors of companies formed under its authority
42 shall be liable for dam-
age caused to the company by their violation of law, administrative regulation or the com-
pany’s articles of association.
43  It did not mention any concept similar to the open-ended 
fiduciary duty of loyalty and, more importantly, did not authorize shareholders to initiate 
any action upon an allegation of such unauthorized conduct nor was it interpreted by courts 
to do so.   
 
  Nevertheless, some PRC courts did from time to time signal receptivity to the idea 
of a shareholder suing on the corporation’s behalf to redress injury caused by an alleged vi-
olation of law.
44  In 1997, a court in Fuijian Province upheld the right of a minority share-
holder (in a joint venture corporation) to sue on the corporation’s behalf on a debt where the 
majority of the board were related to the debtor, and had refused to do so.  The courts said:  
 
  “If the infringement suffered by the shareholders is to the right of the company, then 
the shareholders should first present a written application to the organ of power of the com-
pany requesting that the company take action ….Where the company does not take any ac-
tion, the shareholder may in its stead bring a lawsuit.” (Clark, 2008, citing Xie and Chen, 
2001). 
 
  This is a clear statement of the derivative theory and its articulation by a Chinese 
provincial court in 1997 evidences the strong appeal of the logic of the form of action.  
                                                 
 
42  e.g Articles 59, 60 and 61, the PRC Company Law of 1994. 
43  See Article  63, the PRC Company Law of 1994. 
44 An early example, dealing with a foreign joint venture involved the Zhangjiagang Fiber Com-
pany in which the Supreme People’s Court allowed a Chinese joint venture partner to sue on behalf of the 
joint venture when the managing partner had refused to do so allegedly because it had inappropriate motiva-
tions. See Deng (2005).  33 
 
 
Nevertheless, other provincial courts during this period rejected the theory (Shen, 2008 and 
Deng, 2005).
45   
 
  In its Corporate Governance Code, the CSRC endorsed the concept of the derivative 
lawsuit when, it stated that: 
 
  “Shareholders shall have the right to protect their interests and rights through 
civil litigation or other legal means in accordance with law and administrative 
regulation. In the event the resolutions of the shareholders’ meeting or the res-
olutions of the board of directors are in breach of laws or administrative regu-
lation, or infringe shareholders’ legal interests or rights, the shareholders shall 
have the right to initiate litigation….”   
 
  But it is not free from doubt that the CSRC intended to try to advance derivative 
lawsuits by this provision. This translation of the language of Article 4 of the Corporate 
Governance Code appears on the CSRC website. Some scholars, however, translate the 
provisions as giving shareholders only the right to demand the company initiate lawsuits 
(Clarke 2008).   
  
  3.4.3.  Derivative Suits and Shareholder Problems of Collective Action  
 
  Despite the shadowy legitimacy of shareholder derivative suits prior to the 2005 re-
vision of the Company Law, the legitimacy of the shareholders derivative suits in China 
was made clear in Article 152 of the PRC Company Law of 2005.  That enactment specifi-
cally acknowledged corporate directors owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and care (Art. 146) 
and also authorized derivative suits by shareholders.  The pre-conditions to such suits are 
first, plaintiffs must represent more than one percent of the shares of the company for more 
than 180 consecutive days, alone or jointly.  Second, demand to sue must be made upon the 
board of directors and suit may be filed only after thirty days following such a demand.  The 
latter prerequisite is designed to allow the corporate board an opportunity to study the mat-
ter and take action with respect to it.  It is a conventional precondition to such suits in the 
U.S.  The first requirement appears to be an attempt to limit so-called “strike suits” brought 
by persons with insignificant equity investment merely for the purpose of extract a nuisance 
settlement.  It may however serve as an impediment to meritorious claims also. 
  
    It is early to judge whether this new statutory authorization may in time provide a 
remedy that is useful to shareholders, but there is, in the short term, little hope for a strong 
investor protection tool at present with respect to listed companies.  The problem stems 
from the fact that investors who buy shares on securities markets generally face sever col-
lective action disabilities caused by their small proportionate interest in the firm. There ap-
pears to be little willingness to innovate a solution to the collective action problem that po-
                                                 
 
45 See, San Jiu Pharmaceutical Company, where the Shenzhen Basic Level People’s Court rejected 
a derivative suit unless unanimous shareholder action was taken (an obviously impossible pre-condition to 
such suits). See Deng (2005).  34 
 
 
tential shareholder plaintiffs would face.  For the holder of a relatively small proportion of 
total shares, the costs of suit would be prohibitive, even if the claim to be litigated seemed 
quite strong, unless there were a mechanism to allow these costs to be shared among all 
other shares.  Yet neither the statutory law nor judicial innovation recognizes a way to im-
pose this cost sharing.   
 
  Thus, the few derivative cases that are found in modern Chinese law tend to be cases 
involving joint ventures in a corporate form.  In those cases, the representative plain-
tiff necessarily own a large proportionate share of the firm (and of potential damag-
es).  This may provide sufficient economic incentive for him to bear the costs of 
bringing such a suit.  Where the investors stake is proportionately small however, 
unless there is a way to force the sharing of his costs, such an investor will not sue, 
even if the violation is clear.  But neither the PRC Company Law , nor the few 
courts who have discussed derivative suits, have suggested that costs of this litiga-
tion, including attorney’s fees, might be awarded to a successful derivative plaintiff.  
Therefore, it is not to be expected that shareholders who acquire shares on the ex-
change will undertake to fund such litigation, where they own only a minor percen-
tage of the company’s securities.  
  
  Thus despite the fact that formally Chinese law has adopted the investor initiated 
derivative suit, at this time courts are not in fact a realistic source of constraint on manage-
ment misbehavior in Chinese listed companies.  
 
 
PART IV:   THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S “TOP DOWN”  
     SECURITIES MARKETS  
 
4.1   Assessing a Great Accomplishment  
 
The creation in less than twenty years of the complex technological, financial and 
legal infrastructure necessary to operate the two mainland securities exchanges is unques-
tionably a great achievement. With these exchanges, and the corporatization effort that is 
their premise, the people of China have created one of the essential working parts of a 
world-class economy.  They have successfully organized the former state and provincial 
production facilities into individual firms in which professional managers can direct activi-
ties with an eye to market-oriented production. They have created embryonic corporate go-
vernance structures and a structure of legal rights and duties that might be used to create 
more highly elaborated investor based corporate governance protections in the future.  They 
have created a means for the corporatized firms to access domestic household savings and 
world global investment pools.  They have created the option to institute some forms of 
stock or stock price related incentive compensation for professional senior managers.  And 
they have made initiating some forms of capital markets based disciplinary methods such as 
takeovers, a policy option for the future, as well.      
Nevertheless in their present state these markets represent more potential value to 
China than realized value.  They are not economically highly important yet. While the equi-
ty markets have grown rapidly in terms of market capitalization and in terms of listings, 35 
 
 
when compared to the securities markets in more developed financial systems, they appear 
as quite small relative to the Chinese economy.  They lack deep liquidity and are excessive-
ly volatile; there is good evidence that they do not price equities very efficiently.  An eco-
nomically significant market for non-governmental bonds has not yet arisen in China and is 
important.  Financial risk management has been severely limited in part because hedging 
opportunities are constricted by a prohibition, now to be eased, on borrowing shares.  Fu-
tures markets for securities are in their infancy. Quite significantly the public markets con-
tinue to offer little assistance in funding growth in the important non-governmental sector of 
the economy.  And by most accounts there is significant level of managerial and other forms 
of corruption and virtually little investor corporate governance remedies available.   
 
4.2   Future Development Steps  
 
  A more important role for securities markets could include most importantly (1) 
broader access to the securities markets for the purpose of raising capital for the entrepre-
neurial sector of the economy, (2) the development of a substantial commercial bond market 
open to all corporate borrowers of requisite credit standing, (3) the development of an array 
of financial instruments capable of hedging of financial risk, which is now beginning (4) the 
gradual floatation into the market of a majority of outstanding voting stock in a significant 
number of former SOEs, and possibly, (5) the development of public shareholder protective 
institutions of corporate governance, as discussed above, including development of the in-
frastructure necessary for proxy voting, tender offers and shareholder law suits.  Consistent 
with policy on the country’s currency, a more developed PRC securities market might also 
involve, (6) easier access for foreign investors to Chinese markets and securities, and (7) 
easier access for domestic investors to foreign shares through the Hong Kong or Shanghai 
Stock Exchanges.  Were the leadership to permit and direct this further development of the 
securities markets, we would expect those markets to more effectively provide to the Chi-
nese economy the three great benefits of fully developed securities markets: (relatively) ef-
ficient capital allocation, flexible financial risk management and useful techniques of finan-
cial market discipline of ineffective corporate management.  
  
  Expansion of the use of securities markets would have distinct economic or devel-
opment advantages for China, but it would raise two related issues.  First, more significant 
securities markets would heighten political issues of Communist Party control that econom-
ic liberalization generally and securities markets particularly have raised from the beginning 
of reform. A market allocation of capital and market discipline of managers, if they are to 
be effective, would entail reduction in the ability of Communist Party committees to direct 
economic development, to appoint senior managers of firms and to direct operational out-
comes on the firm level.  While in the event of such liberalization, the sovereign power of 
the government could redirect its control to external tax and regulation of business to some 
extent, such a system would inevitably have less direct and immediate control over listed 
firms than the present system offers.  Thus these are effects that are unlikely to be eagerly 
embraced in the near future.  Secondly, and more abstractly, fundamental growth in the se-
curities markets (meaning a change in their structural limitations) raises the question: to 
what extent does or should China wish to expose its economy to the types of gyrations that 
the financial crisis of 2008-09 has shown, again, that capital markets including securities 36 
 
 
markets are capable?  The claim of some in the U.S. that its system, dominated by financial 
markets of ever greater complexity and shorter average holding periods, has become unduly 
short term oriented, is often dismissed by academic commentators.  But it is unlikely that 
the near collapse of the U.S. financial system in the fall of 2008 leaves its model of finance 
in quite the same position as a role model.  China’s quick bounce-back from the global fi-
nancial crisis of 2008-09, on the other hand, leaves its leadership or elements among its lea-
dership in a position to question the value of such capital market liberalization.  
 
  Almost certainly the leadership will feel its way in assessing the risks and benefits of 
further expansion of the economic role that securities markets play in the Chinese economy. 
We do, however, have least two telling bits of evidence of an intention to foster further de-
velopment of the Chinese securities markets. First, despite its occurring before the global 
financial crisis, the elaborate effort of the Chinese government to remove the NTS designa-
tion, briefly outlined in this essay provides strong evidence that the leadership recently in-
tended for the securities markets to have the capacity to grow into more powerful instru-
mentalities of finance. Second more recently, the 2010 approval of futures trading and short 
selling innovations confirm that intent in unchanged.  
  
  Of course, it is very unlikely that the leadership will, for the foreseeable future, al-
low the most significant components of the economy – the large banks and insurance com-
panies, natural resource companies, the national transport infrastructure and the telecom in-
dustries, for example – to be subject to the risk of investor “interference” that might poten-
tially occur if a majority of voting shares of these firms were traded in the markets.  But, we 
assume, that in the next period of development (whenever that may occur) the leadership 
will direct that a majority of the shares of at least some SOEs in non-strategic sectors of the 
Chinese economy be moved from government control into non-government, including mar-
ket control.  Thus, we expect certain firms in consumer electronics and soft goods, textiles, 
footwear, recreation & leisure, home supplies and repair materials, health, beauty and hy-
giene products, and various other non-strategic products or activities to increase the propor-
tion of their shares that trade on securities markets.  Furthermore, we expect that CSRC 
continuing current efforts to open the securities market to smaller entrepreneurial enterpris-
es will meet with some success and we will in future observe greater use of securities mar-
kets by private entrepreneurial or foreign firms.  Even these steps however will take time.  
  
4.3   The Secondary Role of Legal Infrastructure in Chinese Securities Markets 
 
     Continued growth in Chinese securities markets, however, is not dependent on im-
provements in the legal infrastructure of those markets.  While the attractiveness of those 
markets to investors would be increased by, e.g., the improvement in quality of financial 
statement disclosure, the reduction in insider trading, or improvements in corporate gover-
nance generally, such changes are not essential presently.  Chinese securities markets will 
continue to attract domestic and international investors without improvement in corporate 
governance protections for the immediate and indefinite future.  Even substantial levels of 
investor exploitation by managers or by controlling shareholders – for example, insider 
trading, self-dealing transactions, or other forms of corruption – need not prevent the devel-




  What is essential for these markets to continue to grow is only that the perceived 
expected risk-adjusted returns available to investors, net of the expected cost of exploitation, 
is attractive when compared to all alternative opportunities to invest funds. Therefore, so 
long as the net returns expected to be generated on Chinese securities markets exceed risk 
adjusted expected returns offered by alternative investment opportunities, Chinese markets 
will continue to attract investors.  It is the growth of the Chinese economy, not the im-
provement of Chinese corporate governance that is the primary driver of the growth in the 
Chinese securities markets.  While there has been some controversy about just how accurate 
the reported growth rates for China have been, there is no doubt that real growth rates over 
the period 1990-2008 have been very high.
46  Indeed some informed views see this growth 
rate continuing for a substantial period (Fogel 2006).  
 
4.4    Are Investor Initiated Protections and More Efficient Securities  
   Markets Likely in Modern China? 
 
The fact that we can expect the Chinese stock markets to continue to be highly at-
tractive to international investors, even if we expect no improvement in legal infrastructure 
of those markets, does not mean improvement in corporate governance and other public in-
vestor protections is unimportant for China. The logic is compelling that, holding all other 
factors constant, an improvement in the range of financial products available in the securi-
ties markets, in access to listing and in the quality of disclosure together with a reduction in 
the amount of investor exploitation would  reduce the costs at which capital would be com-
mitted to investment in China and improve the efficiency with which capital would be allo-
cated among potential users.  Regardless of the period in which elevated growth rates can 
continue, experience teaches that, in time, these growth rates will reduce.  When that occurs, 
the marginal improvement in costs of capital that investor protective governance can yield 
systemically will become relatively more important.  
 
As one looks to that future, one can imagine the leadership of the country consider-
ing steps to try to make investment in China more attractive both to international capital and 
more importantly to domestic savers.  Obvious first steps would be improvements in trans-
parency,  in reducing corruption and management inefficiency.  The first instinct will pre-
sumably be China’s traditional top-down style response – that is, an increase in CCP cam-
paigns to encourage right conduct and diligence.  Should such campaigns fail, as one might 
expect, then we would expect the second top down response: greater or more effective party 
discipline or official prosecution of corruption. But there are reasons to think even that 
technique would, alone, be ineffective.  Public officials or party secretaries are likely to 
have either poorer quality information concerning breaches of fiduciary duty (or sub-par 
managerial performance) or weaker incentives to take corrective action than investors, 
                                                 
 
46 While officially reported statistics on Chinese GDP growth rates have been controversial, see 
Thurow, Zhou and Wang (2003) (using data on electricity consumption to cast doubt on reliable of official 
GDP growth rate numbers). Official government sources reported the average real growth of GDP over the 
period 1999 to close of 2008 was 14.4% per year. See China Statistical Yearbook (2008).  38 
 
 
whose financial interests are adversely affected by managerial conduct.  Therefore, at some 
point in time the leadership of the country will experience increased pressure to improve the 
whole range of practices concerning internal corporate affairs.  When this does occur the 
leadership will face again some recurring issues: how much can decentralized, shareholder 
initiated mechanisms be trusted; how much can “rule of law” institutions, such as share-
holder voice and independent courts or free access to listing by all who meet objective crite-
ria, be made consistent with China’s culture and existing political institutions?   
 
Can fostering better disclosure, less administratively controlled access to finance 
and greater privately initiated governance mechanisms be consistent with the leadership role 
of the CCP in China’s one party state?  There seems to be no reason in logic why it cannot.  
Control over law creation, taxation and law enforcement (not to mention appointment and 
pay of the judiciary) provides sufficient levers to allow the leadership effectively to guide 
the direction and speed of economic growth without losing that degree of control necessary 
to safeguard those values that the leadership holds most sacred. Yet change always does en-
tail unforeseen risks.  Much of the magnificent success that has occurred in the development 
of the Chinese economy over the last 30 years, despite being increasingly guided by free 
market prices, has occurred on a top-down, controlled model of development.
47  Movement 
towards a more decentralized “bottom- up” mode of change, marked in the securities regu-
lation area by high quality disclosure, investor empowerment to change under-performing 
management teams and court adjudication under a “rule of law” approach, can be expected 
to be unwelcomed.   Empowered investors would act through voting shares, or selling 
shares into tender offers or by initiating suit against insiders or other controllers of the firms 
in which they make investments.  These means of action, however, involve instrumentalities 
(boards, courts, shareholder meetings) that, in a bottom up development regime, would not 
formally be a part of or agents of the Chinese Communist Party.  Thus, it is reasonable to 
expect that substantial reform of the corporate governance of firms listed on Chinese securi-
ties markets, will not occur until there is a pressing developmental reason for the leadership 
to force such change. Certainly those pressures are not sufficient at this time to occasion 
real change.  
  
  The existing limitations of the Chinese securities markets can be expected to be re-
medied over time – and the securities markets can be expected to play a more productive 
role in the Chinese economy – if, but only if, the leadership of the country wants Chinese 
securities markets to assume a more important role. This conclusion reflects the fundamen-
tal nature of these markets. Unlike securities markets in New York, London, or Amsterdam, 
the Chinese markets were designed and created by government principally to serve govern-
ment purposes. Like their existence, their future depends upon the judgments to be made by 
the country’s political leadership.  Trying to predict choices those leaders may make is 
                                                 
 
47  It is claimed by Professor Huang, Yasheng some scholars that much growth at the beginning of 
liberalization appears to have been resulted from the spontaneous action of farmers and rural residence when 
simply allowed access to land and ability to contract (Huang, Yasheng, 2007 and 2008).  But certainly with 
respect to the SOEs and the stock markets post 1990, the whole story is one of designed top-down develop-
ment.  39 
 
 
fraught with risk of miscalculation. It seems certain that even absent improvement in the 
practical ability of equity investors to protect their own economic interests, Chinese securi-
ties markets will for a period continue to grow as the PRC economy grows. Thus these mar-
kets will continue to satisfy the limited economic role that they have thus far been permitted 
to play.  But they will not serve the larger important economic functions of efficient capital 
allocation, nor the useful role of signaling, incenting or disciplining corporate management.  
But Rome, we have often been reminded was not built in a day; nor have the great Redwood 
trees of California reached their enormous size and beauty in just sixty years.     
 
   ----  End  ---- 
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